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COMMENTS
SINK OR SWIM? THE STATE OF BILINGUAL
EDUCATION IN THE WAKE OF CALIFORNIA
PROPOSITION 227
Thomas F. Felton'
The "right" to an education enjoys an uncertain level of protection.!
Perhaps because the Constitution never explicitly addresses education,2
the judiciary has not developed a consistent approach to lawsuits based
on the right-or lack thereof-to an education.3 Although many of the
early education cases focused on the roles of race and segregation in
education,4 the focus of educational jurisprudence recently has turned to
the potential right to bilingual education.5 Unlike the racial segregation
J.D. Candidate, May 2000, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law
1. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223, 230 (1982) (holding that, although edu-
cation is not a constitutional right, it merits elevated scrutiny); San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (holding that education is not a constitutionally
guaranteed fundamental right); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (over-
turning the "separate but equal" doctrine); see also, e.g., Michael Klarman, An Interpretive
History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 288 (1991) (stating that
Brown implicitly established education as a fundamental right and that Rodriguez rejected
that notion). Although Plyler purported to uphold Rodriguez, it found education to play
"a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society." Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221.
2. See Klarman, supra note 1, at 288 (stating that in deciding Rodriguez, the Court
refused to acknowledge fundamental rights that were not explicitly or implicitly evident in
the Constitution).
3. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the different holdings of the
Supreme Court with regard to the right to education).
4. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown H)
(mandating that local courts compel school systems to desegregate with "all deliberate
speed"); Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95 (prohibiting segregated schools because separate was
not equal and education was too important not to be equally provided); Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544-549 (1896) (reasoning and holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause was not intended to abolish distinctions based on
race; upholding the doctrine of "separate but equal" accommodations that allowed the
proliferation of segregated schools), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
5. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1974) (holding that schools failing
to address the needs of non-English-speaking students violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, which states that schools must provide students an equal opportunity to educa-
tion); Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1008-1009 (5th Cir. 1981) (Castaneda I) (holding
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cases, which have a clear basis in constitutional jurisprudence,6 the bilin-
gual education issue rests on less firm ground.7 Even though Congress
now requires schools to address the needs of students who speak little or
no English,8 judicial and legislative attempts to address the potential legal
and constitutional protections of bilingual education have done little to
clarify the issue. 9
Historically, the issue of language education was left to individual
families and state and local governments, with minimal intervention from
the Federal judiciary or Congress.'0 Much of the recent push for bilin-
gual education rights began at the grass roots level, as part of the 1960s
civil rights movement." Proponents of bilingual education argued that
teaching students only in a language they did not understand-English-
that bilingual education is not required under the Federal Bilingual Education Act); Vale-
ria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1027-28 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (finding that a constitu-
tional challenge to California's Proposition 227, mandating English-immersion education
for non-English-speaking students, would be unlikely to succeed based solely on the lan-
guage of the measure).
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (mandating equal protection and due process
for all persons); Brown, 347 U.S. at 491-92 (citing cases finding violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, with regard to inequality in education, based on the race of the students).
7. See Lau, 414 U.S. at 566 (declining to decide petitioner's complaint against the
school system on constitutional grounds); Serna v. Portales Mun. Sch., 499 F.2d 1147, 1153
(10th Cir. 1974) (declining, as in Lau, to reach the Fourteenth Amendment issue); Gi
Hyun An, Note, The Right to Bilingual Education: Providing Equal Educational Opportu-
nity for Limited English Proficient Children in a Pluralist, Multicultural Society, 11 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 133, 149 (1996) (finding that courts have found statutory rights to bilingual
education, as opposed to constitutional rights); Alberto T. Fernandez & Sarah W. J. Pell,
Comment, The Right to Receive Bilingual Special Education, 53 EDUC. L. REP. 1067, 1068
(1989) (stating that courts have held consistently that the Equal Protection Clause does
not require schools to provide bilingual education).
8. See Castaneda 1, 648 F.2d at 1008.
9. Compare Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 (EEOA), 20 U.S.C. §§
1701-21 (1994) (mandating only that states overcome language barriers in educating lim-
ited English proficient (LEP) students), with Bilingual Education Act (BEA), 20 U.S.C. §§
7401-91 (1994) (stating that bilingual education involving instruction in English and the
native language is the authorized, basic teaching method) and H.R. REP. No. 105-587, at
18 (1998) (same), available in 1998 WL 323239; compare also Castaneda I, 648 F.2d at
1008-09 (holding that Congress intended to allow states to experiment with bilingual edu-
cation programs under the EEOA), with Cintron v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 455
F. Supp. 57, 63 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that the district's English-language immersion
program conflicted with the EEOA and the BEA and, therefore, was unacceptable).
10. See Rachel F. Moran, The Politics of Discretion: Federal Intervention in Bilingual
Education, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1249, 1257-58 (1988) (discussing the history of language use
and education in America and the Federal Government's lack of involvement).
11. See id. at 1258-59 (discussing the civil rights movement and its impact on the Fed-
eral Government, particularly as evidenced by President Lyndon Johnson's "Great Soci-
ety" program and increased federal involvement in areas of traditional local control).
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was equivalent to not teaching. 2 Parents and Hispanic community lead-
ers argued that bilingual education would allow students to reverse the
trends of low test scores, high dropout rates, and reduced life opportuni-
ties. 3
As the bilingual education movement grew, several teaching method-
ologies developed: the immersion, transitional, and maintenance or de-
velopmental methods." Under the immersion method, limited English
proficient (LEP) students are taught entirely in English, ideally in simple
language, to allow for the internalization of the English language.5 The
transitional method provides for instruction of students partially in Eng-
lish and partially in their native languages, with the goal of moving the
students into mainstream English classes. 6 The maintenance, or devel-
opmental, education method allows students to acquire English while
maintaining their native-language skills. 7 During the past thirty years,
each type of bilingual education has developed its own followers and
each group propounds research that suggests its teaching methodology
works best.
12. See Bilingual Education (visited Aug. 3, 1998) <http://www.edweek.org/context/
topics/biling.htm> (an issue forum).
13. See Moran, supra note 10, at 1259-61 (tracking the hearings surrounding the pas-
sage of the Bilingual Education Act of 1968); see also Lynn Schnaiberg, In Battle Over
Prop. 227, Both Sides Command Armies of Statistics, EDUC. WK., Apr. 29, 1998, at 17 (dis-
cussing the continuing arguments over statistics surrounding bilingual education). Critics
of bilingual education point to the dropout rate among Hispanics, but the California De-
partment of Education does not calculate drop out rates in terms of native-English and
LEP speakers. See id. Supporters of bilingual education point to an internal report pre-
pared in the Los Angeles school district showing that students in bilingual programs
scored better than students in immersion programs on standardized tests. See id. Critics
point to the fact that fewer students in the bilingual program took the tests, and in fact,
fewer than two-thirds of fifth graders in bilingual classes were reading English at grade
level. See id.
14. See Bilingual Education, supra note 12.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See Schnaiberg, supra note 13, at 17 (citing statistics and studies used on both
sides of the bilingual education argument); English First Foundation, Evaluations of Cur-
rent Bilingual Programs (last modified April 27, 1997) <http://www.englishfirst.org/
efbe.htm> (listing various types of bilingual education with information on efficacy).
Among the methodologies advocated are submersion, which involves placement in a class-
room where only English is used; structured immersion, in which the student can use his or
her native language; transitional bilingual education, similar to the transitional model; and
English as a Second Language, where instruction of substantive courses is in English and
the student receives extra instruction in English. See id. English First cites a study that
shows no difference in the results achieved by students in transitional bilingual education
programs and students not taught English at all. See id. The web-site explains that the
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Beginning in the 1960s, the Federal Government became more in-
volved with education in the furtherance of civil rights.19 For its part, the
Federal Government favored transitional bilingual education,0 although
it did not mandate any one teaching style.2' The tension among propo-
nents of these various theories of bilingual education, along with federal
intervention in state and local education decisions, has turned bilingual
22
education into a highly divisive issue facing the country.
With the number of immigrants increasing and the debate over their
education continuing, many states are looking to California for guidance
in legislating bilingual education. 2' Due to its large immigrant popula-
24 21
tion, California is experienced in addressing bilingual education issues.
In addition, California has a general history of initiating legislative
trends.26
reasons for maintaining bilingual education are not the programs' efficacy, but ethnic
pride, mistaken science, or questionable ideologies. See id.
19. See Moran, supra note 10, at 1258-59 (discussing the Federal Government's re-
sponse to the civil rights movement, through such programs as the Elementary and Secon-
dary Education Act of 1965).
20. See EEOA, 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (1994) (making it illegal to deny equal education
to students on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin by failing to address language
difficulties that restrict students' ability to participate in class); BEA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 7402,
7421 (1994) (establishing a policy of educating limited English proficiency children
through bilingual education and providing funds for bilingual education programs); see
also H.R. REP. No. 105-587, at 18 (1998) (stating that the BEA amendments of 1974 fo-
cused on transitional bilingual education), available in 1998 WL 323239.
21. See Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1008-09 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that
Congress did not intend to require adoption of a particular type of language program by
mandating that states take "appropriate action," but rather intended that states develop
their own programs).
22. See Moran, supra note 10, at 1258-59 (stating that federal regulation of bilingual
education under the auspices of protecting civil rights has undercut state and local control
of education); see also Bilingual Education, supra note 12 (providing an outline of the is-
sues surrounding bilingual education and its history); Lynn Schnaiberg, The Politics of
Language, EDUC. WK., Mar. 5, 1997, at 25 (discussing the ongoing debate in school dis-
tricts and state governments and highlighting arguments on both sides).
23. See Lynn Schnaiberg, Will Calif.'s Bellwether Reputation Ring True?, EDUC. WK.,
June 17, 1998, at 6 (listing states that are considering modifications to their bilingual edu-
cation programs and quoting experts and aides regarding the potential effect of the pas-
sage of Proposition 227); see also infra Part IV.A (discussing the expected legislative ef-
fects of California's legislation).
24. See Margot Hornblower, Putting Tongues in Check, TIME, Oct. 9, 1995, at 40, 50.
Currently, almost half of the non-English-speaking students in the United States live in
California. See id.
25. See infra Part II.B (discussing California's implementation of bilingual education
legislation in the 1970s).
26. See Schnaiberg, Will Calif.'s Bellwether Reputation Ring True?, supra note 23, at
6. Currently, states including Arizona, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Washington are
considering altering their bilingual education programs. See id. A bill was also under con-
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Against this backdrop, California voters passed Proposition 227
("Proposition" or "Measure") on June 2, 1998.27 This measure requires
that all non-English-speaking or LEP students be taught English through
immersion classes, rather than through transitional bilingual education. 8
Time in the immersion classes is not to exceed one year in normal cir-
cumstances.29 Immediately following passage of the Proposition, a class
of LEP students filed a lawsuit challenging it, claiming violations of both
the United States Constitution and federal education statutes.30 The
plaintiffs moved for an injunction in the Northern District of California
to prevent implementation of Proposition 227, which was scheduled to
take effect in the fall of 1998.31 The court denied the injunction due to
the plaintiffs' inability to show a likelihood of winning on the merits and,
because the initiative had not yet been implemented, the lack of present
32injury.
By contrast, a more recent Northern District decision granted an in-
junction with regard to the application of Proposition 227 in the San Jose
School District.33 In addition, two schools applied for and were granted
34
exemptions from Proposition 227. By receiving such exemptions, or
sideration in Congress to restructure the federal administration of states' bilingual educa-
tion programs. See H.R. 3892, 105th Cong. (1998) (amending the Elementary and Secon-
dary Education Act to provide block grant funding for bilingual education, limiting the
time students can participate in federally-funded bilingual education classes, and termi-
nating compliance agreements between the Department of Education and school district
regarding bilingual education). The bill passed the House of Representatives on Septem-
ber 10, 1998 and was sent to the Senate, where it expired at the end of the 105th Congress.
See Bilingual Ed. Legislation Passes House, EDUC. WK., Sept. 16, 1998, at 24; infra note
249.
27. Proposition 227, §1, 1998 Cal. Legis. Serv. A-6 to A-9 (West) (codified at CAL.
EDUC. CODE §§ 300-340 (West Supp. 1999)).
28. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 305. The Proposition, in addition to requiring English
immersion programs, allows parental waivers from such programs under certain circum-
stances and provides that any part of the measure that conflicts with any other law is
automatically struck, leaving the rest of the law intact. See id. §§ 310-11, 325.
29. See id. § 305.
30. See Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007,1012 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
31. See id. at 1012.
32. See id. at 1027-28.
33. See U.S. Judge Rejects English-Only Measure, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 1998, at
A18.
34. See Bilingual Schools After All?, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 10, 1998, at A10; Rachel Tuin-
stra et al., 2 Schools Get Prop. 227 Waivers, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Sept. 4, 1998, at Al.
Under state law, the California Board of Education must approve any request for a waiver
from state regulations unless certain conditions exist. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 33051
(West 1993). The education code lists seven criteria under which a waiver cannot be
granted. See id. § 33051(a). The non-waivable conditions include, inter alia, failure to
meet the educational needs of students, jeopardizing parental involvement, or increased
state costs. See id. § 33051(a)(1), (5)-(6).
1999]
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waivers, local schools and school districts can avoid replacing their cur-
rent bilingual program with the Proposition 227-mandated English im-
mersion program."
This Comment examines the history of bilingual education and the ar-
guments for and against language education. Parts I and II explore the
judicial and legislative arguments debating whether being taught in a
non-English native language is a right, and if so, how it is to be carried
out. Part III discusses the background and provisions of Proposition 227
and its impact within the state of California. Part IV proposes that, once
implemented, Proposition 227 could establish boundaries for permissible
types of bilingual education, and will clog the court system in California,
and have other unintended consequences in that state. Finally, this
Comment concludes that the impact of the California vote and any ulti-
mate judicial action will establish guidelines that, when followed by other
school districts across the country, will adversely affect LEP students.
I. FROM THE FOUNDING FATHERS TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION "RIGHTS"
A. You Have the Right to an Education (for now): The Supreme Court
Walks a Fine Line
The Constitution does not grant an explicit right to an education." In
1973, the Supreme Court found that education was neither an implicit
substantive constitutional right nor a fundamental right meriting a high
level of judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause . In San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,38 the parents of Mexi-
can American children filed suit against the school district, claiming that
a variance in school funding due to local property wealth violated the
Equal Protection Clause.3 9 The Court was faced with the issue of
whether education is a fundamental right.0
The Court stated that its province was not "to create substantive con-
35. See Janine DeFao & Lesli Maxwell, Schools Can Seek Bilingual Waivers,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 28, 1998, at Al.
36. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing the history of education in
constitutional jurisprudence and the uncertainty in the judiciary as to the "right" to educa-
tion).
37. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30, 35 (1973).
38. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
39. See id. at 4-6.
40. See id. at 17 (asking whether the Texas system of financing education through
property taxes discriminated against poorer constituencies or impinged on a fundamental
right to education).
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stitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the
laws."4 ' The Court proceeded to deny direct constitutional protection to
education because the Constitution neither explicitly nor implicitly pro-
tects the right to education.4' The Court also rejected the plaintiffs' ar-
gument that because rights, such as free speech, cannot be exercised ef-
fectively without an education, education should be protected as a
fundamental right.43 In rejecting that argument, the Court found Texas's
school funding measure legitimate and therefore refused to intervene to
protect important, but non-fundamental values."
Less than a decade later, the Supreme Court returned to the status of
education rights in Plyler v. Doe.45 In Plyler, students of Mexican origin
brought a class action suit against the state of Texas.4 The state denied
the students attendance at the local public schools because they could
not prove their lawful admission to the United States.4 ' Applying the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,48 the Supreme
Court examined Texas's classification of the undocumented school chil-
dren and analyzed whether that classification disadvantaged a suspect
class or limited a fundamental right.49 Finding the children to constitute a
suspect class,50 the Court turned to the issue of education as a fundamen-
41. Id. at 33. The Court made its pronouncement based on an analysis of an earlier
case, which found that "the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every so-
cial and economic ill." Id. at 32 (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972)).
42. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35. The Court upheld the statement in Brown that
education is an important service, but reserved that such importance is not determinative
of the level of protection attached to a supposed fundamental right. See id. at 30. The
Court continued by saying that a right is fundamental only when it is explicitly or implic-
itly found in the Constitution. See id. at 33-34. A right does not become fundamental by
being important or by being related to other Constitutional rights. See id.
43. See id. at 35-36. The plaintiffs claimed that education is necessary to receive and
assimilate information and to use that information to speak intelligently and persuasively.
See id. The plaintiffs also argued that education was necessary to exercise intelligently the
protected right to vote. See id. at 35-36. The Court stated that such goals were "desir-
able," but that it never assumed it had "the ability or the authority to guarantee to the citi-
zenry the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice." Id. at 36.
44. See id.; see also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Role of Reason in the Rule of Law, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 779, 807 (1989) (explaining Justice Powell's judicial deference to state
authority and expertise in Rodriguez as based on lack of judicial experience in education
matters).
45. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
46. See id. at 206.
47. See id.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (forbidding the denial of equal protection of the
law).
49. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-17.
50. See id. at 218-20. The Court stated that persons who enter the United States ille-
gally may properly be refused governmental benefits due to the voluntary illegality of
19991
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tal right."
The Court began its assessment by stating that education is not a con-
stitutionally granted right, citing directly to Rodriguez 2 The Court con-
tinued, however, stating that education is not just another benefit ei-
ther. 3 Rather, the Court found that "[t]he 'American people have
always regarded education and [the] acquisition of knowledge as matters
of supreme importance.', 5 4 The Court held that education is necessary to
prepare citizens for participation in the American political system and
vital in the transmission of societal values.55 Further, the Court said that
deprivation of education places an obstacle in the path of student
achievement, thus violating the Fourteenth Amendment, which guaran-
tees equal protection of the law to all persons." For this point, the Court
relied on its decision in Brown v. Board of Education,57 where it had
found education to be the most important governmental function that
must be provided to everyone equally, if it is provided to anyone. 8 Thus,
the Court in Plyler, while not overruling Rodriguez, subjected the Texas
law to a higher standard of scrutiny than the Rodriguez Court apparently
would have. 9 Later Court decisions, however, have followed Rodriguez
more closely, casting doubt on Plyler.60
their entry and the ability to correct the violation by going through proper immigration
procedures. See id. at 219-20. The children of illegal immigrants, however, through no
fault of their own, do not have the means to correct either their parents' status or their
own. See id. at 220.
51. Seeid. at 221.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. Id. (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923)).
55. See id.
56. See id. at 221-22. The Court explained that education allows individuals to ad-
vance socially, based on their own merits, whereas deprivation of education handicaps a
person for the rest of his or her life. See id. at 222. When the deprivation is targeted at a
disfavored group, the deprivation violates the guarantee of Equal Protection. See id. at
221-22.
57. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
58. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222-23 (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).
59. Compare id. at 230 (stating that a denial of education must further a substantial
state interest), with San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973)
(holding that the standard to be applied is "whether the challenged state action rationally
furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest").
60. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
857 (13th ed. 1997) (citing Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450 (1988) and
Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983) as following Rodriguez more closely than Plyler).
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B. Does Equal Creation Mean Equal Education? Congress and the
Supreme Court Say "Yes"
61In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Supreme Court upheld the idea of "sepa-
rate but equal" accommodations based on race-an idea that paved the
way for states to segregate schools until Plessy was overturned by
Brown.61 In Brown, African-American students in four states filed class
action suits in an effort to attend nonsegregated public schools.63 The
plaintiffs charged the respective school systems with violations of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, claiming that
the separate facilities were not equal and could not be made equal; there-
64fore, the separate facilities deprived the students of equal protection.
In addressing the equal protection issue, the Court looked first to theS 61
history of the Fourteenth Amendment and its relation to education.
Finding little guidance, the Court stated that the equality of public edu-
cation only could be judged by looking at its place in American society.
66
The Court proceeded to find that education may be the most important
state or local government function due to its necessity in preparation for
life.67 Therefore, the Court said, where states provide education, they
61. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause was not intended to abolish distinctions based on race; upholding the doctrine of
"separate but equal" accommodations), overruled by Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. Justice
Brown's opinion in Plessy stated that state legislatures were "at liberty to act with refer-
ence to the established usages, customs and traditions of the people." Id. at 550.
62. See id.; see also Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. In overturning Plessy, the Brown Court
stated that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal." Brown, 347 U.S. at
495.
63. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 486-87. The cases arose in Kansas, South Carolina, Vir-
ginia, and Delaware. See id. at 486. In all but the Delaware case, the students had been
denied admission to white-attended schools under the "separate but equal" doctrine an-
nounced in Plessy. See id. at 488. The state of Delaware observed the Plessy doctrine but
allowed the African-American students to attend white schools because the segregated
facilities were not equal. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 489-93. The Court looked particularly to the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment and early case law interpreting it. See id. at 489-91. The Court ad-
dressed Plessy and ensuing education cases involving its "separate but equal" doctrine.
See id. at 490-92 & nn.7-8 (discussing inter alia Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) and
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938)). The prior cases had all been de-
cided within the context of the "separate but equal" doctrine; however, none had chal-
lenged the doctrine itself. See id. at 491-92 & n.8.
66. See id. at 492-93. The Court found that education, in particular public education,
was not advanced at the time of the Amendment's passage and did not enter into the de-
bate surrounding the adoption of the Amendment. See id. at 489-90.
67. See id. at 493; see also supra text accompanying 58 (citing the "most important
function" language of Brown).
1999]
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must provide it equally.6' According to the Court, equal education was
69impossible at separate facilities.
The Supreme Court earlier had found a fundamental right in a parent's
right to control his/her child's education in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.°
There, the Court held that states could not require public school instruc-
tion." Oregon had passed a Compulsory Education Act that required all
children between the ages of eight and sixteen to attend public schools. 2
The Society of Sisters challenged the Act as violating parents' rights to
choose the type of education they preferred for their children.73 The Su-
preme Court struck down the Oregon law, agreeing that the Act "inter-
fere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
and education of children under their control. 7 4 The Court held that a
state could not standardize its children by mandating how education was
provided, because attempting to do so violated a "fundamental theory of
liberty."75
The language in the Pierce decision echoed that of an even earlier Su-
preme Court decision regarding parental control and language instruc-
• 76
tion, Meyer v. Nebraska.7 7 Due to anti-German sentiment during World
War I, Nebraska had outlawed the teaching of the German language.
78
In Meyer, the Court invalidated the Nebraska law because it interfered
with parental power to control their children's education. 79 This decision
reflected the view that choices about education, including language, were
68. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
69. See id. at 493-95. The Court found that separating students based solely on race
would generate feelings of inferiority, which in turn would affect the students' ability to
learn. See id. at 494. Based on this finding, the Court expressly overruled the Plessy
Court's contrary holding. See id. at 494-95.
70. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding unanimously that states cannot standardize
instruction by mandating public education).
71. See id.
72. See id. at 530.
73. See id. at 532.
74. Id. at 534-35.
75. Id. at 535.
76. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 60, at 517 (discussing the Court's views in
the Pierce case).
77. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
78. See id. at 401-02 (finding the state's rationale, that the use of foreign words has a
negative effect on children and public safety, understandable based on the experience of
World War 1); see also Moran, supra note 10, at 1257. Moran tracks the development of
the controversy surrounding German language instruction in schools. See id. The contro-
versy began in the nineteenth century and culminated during World War I, resulting in the
elimination of German instruction programs. See id.
79. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401-02.
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similar to choices about religion and culture. 80 Despite the protection
given to education by Meyer, it remained the only significant government
involvement in school curricula between the nation's founding and the
1960s.81
With the 1960s came increased pressure from the civil rights move-
ment, resulting in greater federal involvement in matters previously left
to state and local governments."' Evidence of the Federal Government's
new willingness to become involved can be found in President Lyndon
Johnson's "Great Society" legislative program,83 which included the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 4
Title VI of that Act prohibits any entity receiving federal funds from
discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin.8 ' To enforce
this mandate, Title VI also grants government agencies authority to issue
rules prohibiting discrimination in agency-administered programs. 6 To
address this dualistic, statutory/regulatory approach, the Supreme Court
formulated two different standards, one for challenges brought under the
Title VI statute and another for challenges to violations of the imple-
menting regulations.87 Challengers suing under Title VI implementing
regulations only need to prove that they suffered discrimination from the
effect of a governmental act, rather than from a governmental intent to
discriminate.88 The Supreme Court, however, subjected claims brought
80. See id. at 399 (stating the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment in-
clude "right of the individual ... to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, to worship God"). But cf. id. at 402 (holding that the State does
have power to require classroom instruction in English and passing on state power to
mandate the curriculum for public schools only).
81. See Moran, supra note 10, at 1257-58 (discussing the history of language use and
education in America and the government's lack of involvement).
82. See id. at 1258.
83. See id. The "Great Society" was a program of economic and welfare reform
measures modeled on the New Deal. See THOMAS A. BAILEY & DAVID M. KENNEDY,
THE AMERICAN PAGEANT 867 (8th ed. 1987). One of the goals of the "Great Society"
was the "War on Poverty." See id. at 869. Other results include the Civil Rights Act of
1964, aid to education, and economic redevelopment of the Appalachia region. See id.
84. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)-(h)(6)
(1994)).
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
86. See id. § 2000d-1.
87. Compare Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (hold-
ing that Title VI is coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause and thus requires a
showing of discriminatory intent) with Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1974) (holding
that a violation of the implementing regulation's discriminatory effect language is suffi-
cient for a finding of discrimination).
88. See Lau, 414 U.S. at 568; see also 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1998) (stating that a re-
cipient "may not ... utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of
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directly under Title VI to the same standard used in assessing equal pro-
tection claims--a "discriminatory intent standard."89 For a challenge to
succeed under Title VI, the claimant must demonstrate that he or she
suffered from a discriminatory act of the government that was motivated
by a discriminatory intent.9°
The Court's announcement of the stricter Title VI standard came in
the context of an education claim, in Regents of the University of Califor-
nia v. Bakke.9 Bakke, a white male student, sued the University of Cali-
fornia, challenging the graduate school's special admission policy for mi-
norities after being denied entrance into medical school. 9  Bakke
challenged the admission policy in part on a claim that the special admis-
sions program violated Title VI. 93 Despite the filing of six separate
opinions, 94 a five-justice majority agreed that Title VI and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause are coextensive.9 The fractious nature of the Bakke
subjecting individuals to discrimination").
89. Compare Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 584,
607 (1983) (holding that discriminatory intent is required for compensatory, but not for
injunctive relief under Title VI), with id. at 608 n.1 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (listing
the seven Justices supporting the discriminatory intent requirement for any Title VI viola-
tion, along with Justice White's intent requirement for compensatory relief), and Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245 (1976) (holding that discriminatory intent is necessary to
show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause); see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287 (holding
that Title VI is coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause); Castaneda v. Pickard, 648
F.2d 989, 1007 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Davis and Bakke for the principle that violations of
Title VI require a showing of discriminatory intent). In Guardians, Justice White, writing
for the plurality, stated that Bakke did not overrule the Lau holding that a Title VI chal-
lenge required proof of discriminatory intent. See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 590. Even if
Bakke did overrule that part of Lau, Justice White continued, Bakke did not reach the
holding that implementing regulations required more than a showing of discriminatory
impact. See id. at 591-93.
90. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 239, 242 (holding that a law or act that has a larger impact
on one group or race than another is not unconstitutional without a showing of the gov-
ernment's intent to discriminate).
91. 438 U.S. 265, 276-78 (1978) (challenging the school's policy of reserving a limited
number of spaces in the incoming class for minority students).
92. See id. The school had two admissions committees, one for general admissions
and one for special admissions. See id. at 272-74. The special admissions committee con-
sidered economically and educationally disadvantaged applicants and minorities. See id.
at 274-75. Applicants considered through the special admissions program did not have to
meet the strict academic requirements of general admissions applicants. See id. at 275.
93. See id. at 277-78.
94. See id. at 269, 324, 379, 387, 402, 408. Two four-justice concurring and dissenting
opinions were filed and three additional single opinions were also filed. See id.
95. See id. at 287 (holding that Title VI prohibits only those racial categories prohib-
ited by the Fifth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause); see also id. at 328 (Bren-
nan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ. concurring and dissenting) (concurring with that
part of the majority holding). The remaining four Justices, in an opinion by Justice Stev-
ens, declined to reach the constitutional issues, but focused only on the language of Title
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holding, however, has left lower courts little guidance regarding the en-
• • • 96
forcement of the right to equal educational opportunities.
II. PROTECTING THOSE WHO DON'T UNDERSTAND: EQUAL
PROTECTION AND BILINGUAL EDUCATION
A. Law and Public Policy: Judicial and Legislative Oversight of Bilingual
Education
In an effort to enforce Title VI, in 1964, the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW)9 issued guidelines prohibiting recipients
of federal funds from using race, color, or national origin as a basis for
providing disparate services and benefits or for restricting access to such
opportunities.9 The regulations define discrimination in the realm of
education as including discrimination in the use of academic or other fa-
cilities. 99 In particular, HEW issued guidelines in 1970 requiring federally
funded school districts to address any obstacles to learning posed by en-
rolled students' lack of English language proficiency.'
The Supreme Court defined the reach of the HEW guidelines in Lau v.
Nichols."° In 1971, the San Francisco, California school system enrolled
2,856 students of Chinese descent who did not speak English. Fewer
than one-half of those students were taught English.0 3 In 1974, a class of
Chinese students sued the school system, claiming violations of both the
Equal Protection Clause and Title VI, and demanding that the Board of
VI. See id. at 418; see also Davis, 426 U.S. at 274-78 (holding that violations of the Equal
Protection Clause require findings of discriminatory intent and not mere discriminatory
effect).
96. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that the
opinion in Bakke, delivered by Justice Powell, is not binding precedent because he was the
only signer and the opinion has never been adopted by the Court); Castaneda v. Pickard,
648 F.2d 989, 1007 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding that a majority of justices (including Justice
Powell) did reach agreement on the Title VI issue in Bakke and, as a result, questioning
the value of the holding in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974)); Valeria G. v. Wilson 12 F.
Supp. 2d 1007, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (stating that "regardless of which standard applies,"
the plaintiffs were unlikely to win on the merits).
97. In 1979, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare became the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services upon the creation of the Department of Education.
See Act of Oct. 17, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat. 668, 695.
98. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b) (1998); see also 29 Fed. Reg. 16,298, 16,299 (1964).
99. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.5(b).
100. See 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595, 11,595 (1970).
101. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
102. See id. at 564.
103. See id. (noting that only approximately 1000 of these students were given addi-
tional training in the English language).
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Education develop a solution to the lack of English instruction.'°4 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court ruling denying relief to the stu-
dents, finding no violation of either the Equal Protection Clause or Title
V .1
05
In overruling the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court did not reach the
equal protection claim, but found support for its decision in Title VI.1" 6
The Court looked to California's education policy of ensuring that all
pupils master the English language.' 7 The Court found that providing
the same facilities and curriculum did not translate to equal educational
opportunities for students who did not understand English."' 8 In fact, the
Court stated that the classroom experience lacks meaning when students
cannot understand the language of instruction9
Such an experience, the Court said, resulted in the Chinese-speaking
students receiving fewer benefits than English-speaking students did be-
cause the language barrier denied these students the opportunity to par-
ticipate in school." ° Citing HEW's definition of discrimination and its
regulations prohibiting discriminatory effect, "' the Court found that the
Chinese-speaking students were subjected to discrimination under the
school system's language policy. In fact, the Court held that Title VI
alone did not require a showing of discriminatory intent to prove a viola-
tion. "3 The Court then held that such discrimination was prohibited be-
cause the San Francisco School District received federal funds.!14 Signifi-
cantly, however, the suit did not request a specific remedy and the
Supreme Court did not provide one. " '
104. See id. at 564-65.
105. Seeid. at 565.
106. See id. at 566 (citing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which bans discrimination on
the basis of race, color or national origin in any program receiving federal funding).
107. See id. at 565 (citing California's Education Code).
108. See id. at 566.
109. See id.; see also Bilingual Education, supra note 12 (presenting the argument that
teaching students in a language they cannot understand is not teaching).
110. See 414 U.S. at 568.
111. See id. at 568-69 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1973)).
112. See id. at 568.
113. See id. at 569. But see Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
287 (1978) (interpreting Title VI to be coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause,
which does require discriminatory purpose); see also Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989,
1007 (5th Cir. 1981) (questioning the validity of the Lau holding in light of Bakke).
114. See Lau, 414 U.S. at 566, 568-69.
115. See id. at 564, 568-69 (stating that plaintiffs sought only to force the Board of
Education to address the issue of LEP students).
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Congress responded to the Lau decision in two ways."6 The first was
the passage of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974
(EEOA)."7 Ostensibly, the purpose of the EEOA was to address issues
remaining from the desegregation of school systems under Brown."' The
EEOA prohibited states from denying equal educational opportunities
to students based on race, color, sex, or national origin." 9 In addition,
however, the EEOA required schools and other educational agencies to
overcome language barriers to a student's equal participation. The in-
clusion of such statutory language has provided the basis for numerous
applications of the EEOA to matters outside of the historic racial segre-
gation context.21
116. See Moran, supra note 10, at 1270 (tracking Congress's response to Lau and the
effects of its actions).
117. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-21 (1994). The EEOA established that all children, regardless
of race, color, sex, or national origin, were entitled to equal educational opportunities. See
id. § 1701. The EEOA focused primarily on race and busing, as evidenced by a provision
that neighborhoods should be used to determine assignments of students to schools. See
id. § 1701(a)(2). Language in 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f), however, specifically requires that states
address language barriers. See id. § 1703(f); see also infra notes 120-21 and accompanying
text (citing cases where § 1703(f) claims were brought by plaintiffs claiming school bilin-
gual education programs did not adequately address language education).
118. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1211, at 154 (1974) ("[Tlhe purpose ... is to specify
appropriate remedies for the orderly removal of the vestiges of the dual school system."),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4206, 4219.
119. See 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (1994). In the House Conference Report, only race, color,
and sex were specifically mentioned. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1211, at 154 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4219; cf. Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-380, 88 Stat. 484, 514 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1701) (stating as policy that
equal educational opportunities must be provided to all students regardless of "race, color,
sex, or national origin").
120. See 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f). The EEOA stated that the policy of the United States
was that all children were entitled to an equal opportunity for education. See id. §
1701(a)(1). In furtherance of that policy, the EEOA prohibited states from denying any-
one an equal opportunity to an education based on race, color, sex, or national origin. See
id. § 1703. The EEOA then enumerated specific prohibited policies, including "deliberate
segregation" within schools based on race, color, or national origin, failure to eliminate
remnants of a segregated school system, and failure to take "appropriate action" to rem-
edy language barriers that impeded student participation in education. See id. §
1703(a),(b),(f); see also Martin Luther King Jr. Elementary Sch. Children v. Ann Arbor
Sch. Dist. Bd., 473 F. Supp. 1371, 1383 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (holding that a school's language
education program must consider the student's home language (in this case "Black Eng-
lish") and its effect on the student to avoid violating § 1703(f) of the EEOA). In address-
ing language barriers, the fact that teachers and students orally understand each other is
not enough to end examination under § 1703(f). See id. at 1379. Appropriate reading
skills are also required to meet the standard of equal participation. See id. at 1377. The
Eastern District of Michigan held that teachers should recognize and use students' home
language to teach reading skills in standard English. See id. at 1383.
121. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir. 1981) (charging the
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Congress's second action was a direct response to the Lau decision.'
In its ruling, the Court allowed the state and local school districts to de-
cide what action to take to overcome the language barriers.2 1 Congress,
however, decided it would address the teaching methodologies.124
Prior to 1974, Congress had provided funding for bilingual education
but had not established a preferred teaching style.125 After Lau, however,
Congress did address the methodology issue in its 1974 amendments to
the Bilingual Education Act.'26 In those amendments, Congress provided
school district with violating the EEOA, not through segregation by race, but for failing to
address the language barrier between LEP students and native English speakers). The
plaintiffs also charged that the school district practiced unlawful segregation through class-
room assignments. See id.; Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1016 (N.D. Cal.
1998) (addressing plaintiffs' claim that Proposition 227 violates § 1703(f) of the EEOA,
which prohibits states from failing to take "appropriate action" to address language barri-
ers).
122. See H.R. REP. No. 93-805, at 69 (1974) (stating that the Lau decision indicates
the need for federal oversight of bilingual education), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
4150-51. The plaintiffs in Lau did not seek a specific remedy or request a particular
teaching methodology. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 564 (1974). The Court acknowl-
edged this, stating, "[tleaching English to the students ... is one choice. Giving instruc-
tions to this group in Chinese is another. There may be others." Id. at 565. The Fifth Cir-
cuit later quoted this language in upholding a Texas school district's bilingual education
program. See Castaneda 1, 648 F.2d at 1006. Such a statement, the Fifth Circuit said, indi-
cates that school districts have several different options for teaching non-English-speaking
students. See id. Bilingual education is just one option. See id.
123. See Lau, 414 U.S. at 564-65; see also H.R. REP. No. 105-587, at 11-12 (1998)
(tracking the history of the Bilingual Education Act and finding that the Lau decision left
to the state and local authorities the decision on which teaching methodology to use),
available in 1998 WL 323239.
124. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1211, at 147-49 (1974) (requiring that bilingual edu-
cation be a full-time program using English and the child's native language and including
native cultural instruction), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4213-14.
125. See S. REP. No. 90-276, at 49-50 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2730,
2780-81. The 1968 amendments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
contained provisions for funding of bilingual education based on evidence that inability to
speak English correlated to school drop-out rates and low incomes. See id. at 49, reprinted
in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2780. The provisions, however, did not require school systems to
adopt a particular methodology, but rather, the provisions permitted experimentation. See
id. at 50, reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2781.
126. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 7401-91; see also H.R. REP. No. 105-587 at 11-12 (1998) (track-
ing the history of the Bilingual Education Act), available in 1998 WL 323239. The Bilin-
gual Education Act was originally passed in 1968 as Title VII of the Elementary and Sec-
ondary Education Act. See id. at 11. The purpose of the Act was to address the problem
of students who were educationally disadvantaged due to a lack of English skills. See S.
REP. No. 90-276, at 49-50 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2780. The bill did not
specify a type of program but encouraged localities to experiment. See id. at 50, reprinted
in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2781. Grants were provided to schools for design and implemen-
tation, and authorization was provided for programs to include historical and cultural in-
struction related to the students' native language. See Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-247, § 704, 81 Stat. 783, 817.
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for transitional bilingual education to be the basic teaching methodology
used by school systems receiving funding under the Bilingual Education
Act. 7
HEW responded to the Supreme Court decision by issuing so-called
"Lau Guidelines" in an effort to assist school districts that found them-
selves in violation of Title VI after the Lau decision. Later cases, such
as Castaneda v. Pickard129 (Castaneda I), called the efficacy of these
guidelines into question.3
In Castaneda I, the Fifth Circuit also addressed whether transitional
bilingual education, the preferred method, was in fact the only allowable
method."' In the original suit, Mexican American children and their
parents charged the Raymondville, Texas Independent School District
with failing to provide adequate instructional programming to overcome
the language barriers between English-speaking students and LEP stu-
dents. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit first addressed the plaintiffs' Title
127. See Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 703(a)(4)(A), 88 Stat.
484, 504-05 (1974) (defining bilingual education within the meaning of the act); see also
H.R. REP. No. 105-587, at 11-13 (1985), available in 1998 WL 323239. Congress pointed to
findings that teaching in the native tongue while teaching in English, prevents a loss of
performance in substantive skills. See id. In passing these amendments, Congress at-
tempted to expand the number of schools qualified to receive federal funding under the
Bilingual Education Act. See H.R. REP. No. 93-805, at 66-68 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4093, 4148-49. This attempt was aimed at correcting what Congress saw as
one of the biggest failings in bilingual education, lack of funding. See id. at 68, reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4149.
128. See Task-Force Findings Specifying Remedies Available for Eliminating Past
Educational Practices Ruled Unlawful under Lau v. Nichols, Office for Civil Rights, re-
printed in BILINGUAL EDUCATION 213 (Keith A. Baker & Adriana A. De Kanter eds.,
1983); see also Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1006-07 (5th Cir. 1981) (tracking the
history of HEW regulation of bilingual education). The Lau guidelines were not pub-
lished. See id. at 1007.
129. 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981).
130. See id. (questioning the "Lau Guidelines"' relevance after Bakke and Davis).
131. See id. at 1006. The plaintiffs contended that the language remediation program,
used by the local school district, did not comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act or
EEOA § 1703(f). See id. at 992. In upholding the program itself, the Fifth Circuit based
its decision on the "appropriate action" language in that section. See id. at 1007-09. By
using the more general "appropriate action" language, rather than a more specific phrase,
such as "bilingual education," the Fifth Circuit reasoned that Congress did not intend to
mandate bilingual education in local school districts. See id. at 1009.
132. See id. at 992. The claims filed against the school district also included racial dis-
crimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act. See id. The claims were based on the district's hiring practices and the grouping of
students by their ability level, determined through standardized testing, grades, teacher
evaluations and school counselor recommendations. See id. at 992, 998. The plaintiffs also
argued that the bilingual program was inadequate under EEOA § 1703(f) and a violation
of Title VI. See id. at 992. The plaintiffs supported their complaint by alleging a failure to
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• • 133VI claim. Responding to the claim that the district's bilingual educa-
tion program violated the Lau holding and HEW's "Lau Guidelines,"
the Fifth Circuit cited HEW's own decision that failure to follow the
Guidelines is not determinative of a Title VI violation. 34 The court then
questioned the applicability of both the HEW guidelines and the decision
in Lau, in the wake of more recent precedent which established stricter
requirements for Title VI violations than those established by Lau.33
In addressing the EEOA claim, however, the Castaneda I court upheld
what it called the "essential holding of Lau," that schools could not ig-noretheneed ofEP "" .136
nore the needs of LEP students. The threshold question, the court
said, becomes what Lau and the EEOA require of schools in addressing
LEP students.'37 Looking to the language of the EEOA, codified at 20
U.S.C. § 1703(f), the court held that the meaning of "appropriate action"
meant only that some action must be taken by states and localities to
meet the anti-discrimination requirement.'
comply with the Lau guidelines. See id. at 1006. This allegation was made despite a prior
HEW assessment of the District's Title VI compliance that concluded failure to comply
with the guidelines is not determinative of Title VI a violation. See id. at 1007.
Raymondville, Texas is located in Willacy County in the Rio Grande Valley, one of the
poorest counties in Texas (ranking 248th out of the 254 counties for average household
income). See id. at 993. The population at the time of the suit was estimated at 77%
Mexican American and 23% Anglo-American. See id. The student population was 85%
Mexican American, whereas only 27% of the district teachers were Mexican American.
See id. at 993, 998.
133. See id. at 1006-07.
134. See id. at 1007. In 1973, representatives from HEW visited the Raymondville
school district and found the district in violation of Title VI and its implementing regula-
tions. See id. at 992. After failed negotiations between the district and HEW, the agency
sought to have the district's federal funding revoked. See id. at 993. The district requested
and received a hearing on HEW's findings. See id. The case was heard before an adminis-
trative law judge who found that the district was not in violation of Title VI, a holding that
was upheld upon review by HEW's Office for Civil Rights. See id. at 992-93.
135. See id. at 1007. The court cited specifically Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976), which held that discriminatory intent must be proven to find a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, and University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978) which held that Title VI was coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause. See
Castaneda 1, 648 F.2d at 1007; see also supra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing
the earlier, lower standard announced in Lau that Title VI claims are subject to proof of
discriminatory effect, not intent).
136. Castaneda I, 648 F.2d at 1008. The court acknowledged that in enacting § 1703(f)
of the EEOA, Congress codified much of the Lau holding. See id.
137. See id. The court needed to address whether Congress intended the term "ap-
propriate action" to place more specific obligations on schools than the general obligation
of "some action" as imposed by the Lau holding. See id.
138. See id. at 1007-09. Citing a lack of legislative history, the court based its decision
on the plain language of the statute, in conjunction with contextual clues, such as the si-
multaneous enactment of the more specific Bilingual Education Act. See id. The court
also looked to the history of bilingual education and found that due to the then-
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In § 1706 of the EEOA as codified, however, the court found that
Congress imposed on courts the responsibility to determine whether
schools met the obligation to remedy language barriers.'39 To assess the
school's compliance with the EEOA, the Fifth Circuit developed a three-
pronged test for bilingual educational programs: (1) whether the educa-
tional theory on which the program is based is sound; (2) whether the
theory endorsed is implemented effectively; and (3) whether the program
achieves results.40  Applying that test, the court found that the Ray-
mondville Independent School District was not implementing the pro-
gram effectively. 41 Principally, the court based its opinion on the inade-
quate Spanish language skills of the teachers responsible for teaching the
LEP students and the inaccuracy of the school district's testing meth-
ods.42 The court remanded the case with directions to identify problems
in the teacher education program and to take any necessary steps to ac-
143quire a valid testing program.
experimental nature of such programs, Congress would have wanted states to experiment,
rather than mandate a specific plan. See id. at 1008-09. The Fifth Circuit also made a
point of stating that acts by an education agency can trigger § 1703(f) even absent an in-
tent to discriminate. See id. at 1007-08. Such a construction approximates the language
Lau applied in its Title VI interpretation. See id.
139. See id. at 1009. EEOA § 1706 grants a private right of action to students to guar-
antee enforcement of the provisions of the Act. See 20 U.S.C. § 1706 (1994).
140. See Castaneda 1, 648 F.2d at 1009-10. The court expressed great reluctance to en-
gage in this program evaluation, finding itself "ill-equipped" to generate standards and
policies of governance "properly reserved to other levels and branches." Id. at 1009. The
court developed a test to evaluate the programs in question without making value judge-
ments. See id. To that end, the first prong of the test merely required that the theory en-
dorsed by the school system be one that at least some educational experts recognize as
sound or experimentally legitimate. See id. Once a program passed this first prong, the
court found the remaining two prongs to be more objectively discernible. See id. at 1010.
141. See id. at 1013-14. In making this determination, the court looked at the qualifi-
cations of the district's teachers to teach Spanish, the district's programs to assess and as-
sist bilingual education teachers to improve their abilities, and the testing procedures im-
plemented by the school district. See id. at 1012-14.
142. See id. at 1013-1015. The record before the court illustrated that many of the
teachers in the bilingual program were unable to converse with or understand the Spanish-
speaking students. See id. at 1012. The school district certified prospective teachers based
on a 100 hour course designed to teach a minimal 700 word vocabulary, culminating in an
exam graded through an informal discussion after the candidates wrote a paragraph in
Spanish, read from a Spanish text, and orally answered questions asked in Spanish. See id.
In this case, the district tested student competency entirely in English, rather than in the
language best understood by the student. See id. at 1014. The court found that such test-
ing might not accurately reflect the student's knowledge, as the student might not under-
stand a question in English. See id. at 1013-14.
143. See id. at 1015. On remand, the district court found that the bilingual teacher is-
sues had been remedied through newly hired Spanish-fluent instructors and that the pro-
gram was in compliance with the EEOA. See Castaneda v. Pickard, 781 F.2d 456, 470 (5th
Cir. 1986) (Castaneda 11). In addition, during the course of the lawsuit, Texas passed the
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B. California Addresses Bilingual Education
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Lau and Congress's pas-
sage of the Bilingual Education Act of 1974-but before Castaneda I
called the methodology requirements into question-California imple-
mented its own Bilingual-Bicultural Education Act in 1976 (BBEA).'14"
In doing so, the State combined the goals of the EEOA and the federal
Bilingual Education Act.145 California established broad outlines allow-
ing the Board of Education to adopt any rules necessary for the imple-
mentation of the BBEA; 146 however, the BBEA specifically provided that
bilingual education should contain teaching components in both English
and the child's native language. 147 As students developed their English
proficiency, the programs were to include more instruction in English
and less instruction in the primary language."' The BBEA defined bilin-
gual-bicultural education as not only including instruction in both Eng-
lish and the pupil's native language, but also development of the stu-
dent's native language skills. 149 Localities were allowed to experiment inimplementing programs to achieve the Act's goals, but only to a limited
Texas Bilingual Education Act. See id. Following the passage of that Act, the plaintiffs
amended their complaint to file under the state law, rather than under the EEOA. See id.
The district court found that both the teacher education program and the testing proce-
dures complied with state law. See id. In affirming those findings, the Fifth Circuit, in
Castaneda 11, suggested that the change of law may have affected the outcome of the case.
See id. ("If Plaintiffs had not taken the position before the district court that they did here,
our review of a school district's compliance with § 1703(f) would be different.").
144. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 52160, 52178, 52178.2 to 52178.3, 52181 (West 1989 &
Supp. 1999).
145. See id. § 52161 (West 1989) (finding that a limited proficiency in English "pres-
ents an obstacle to ... pupils' right to an equal educational opportunity" and stating the
purpose of offering bilingual education as the method to overcome this obstacle). While
California did declare a goal to develop fluency in English and offered bilingual education
to do so, the state left participation in such programs up to the parent or guardian. See id.;
cf. supra notes 113, 115-16, 121-25 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of the
ESEA and BEA).
146. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52162.
147. See id. § 52163(a). The Act defined basic bilingual education as:
a system of instruction which builds upon the language skills of the pupil and
which consists of, but is not limited to ..
(1) A structured English language development component,...
(2) A structured primary language component ... for the purpose of sustaining
achievement in basic subject areas until the transfer to English is made.
Id.
148. See id.
149. See id. § 52163(b) (defining bilingual-bicultural education as including, inter alia,
language development (oral and literacy) in the primary language, reading, teaching of
selected subjects in the primary language, and education in the history and culture associ-
ated with the primary languages taught).
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degree .1 5  The BBEA expired on June 30, 1987s' but continued to form
the framework for state policy.'
Since the "sun-setting" of the BBEA, both the California school board
and the state legislature have attempted to provide new guidance for bi-
-• 153
lingual education. The State Senate introduced the Alpert-Firestone
English Learners Education Reform Act of 1998 (Alpert-Firestone
Act)54 in an effort to allow more flexibility at the local level.' The bill
did not specify a methodology, but instead, "require[d] each school dis-
trict to develop the type of [language] instructional services to best ac-
complish the goals of English language development.'
'15 6
III. YOU WILL BE ASSIMILATED: PROPOSITION 227 TELLS STUDENTS
To SINK OR SWIM
A. Education Policy Makes Strange Bedfellows: Supporters of
Proposition 227 Are an Unlikely Group
The freedom sought by the Alpert-Firestone Act potentially ended on
June 2, 1998 with California's passage of Proposition 227.57 Rather than
allowing school districts to experiment with different approaches to bi-
150. See id. §521 63 (c) (limiting programs to those that conformed to the requirements
of bilingual education under the Act).
151. See id. § 62000.2(e) (establishing the sunset date for the Act).
152. See Lynn Schnaiberg, Calif. Board Revises Policy for LEP Students, EDUC. WK.,
Apr. 15, 1998, at 25 (citing the BBEA's continuing impact); see also Michael J. Fitzgerald,
The Making of an Initiative, CALIF. LAW., May 1998, at 44, 47 (stating that the Bilingual-
Bicultural Education Act of 1976 contained a provision providing for continued state
funding of the bilingual programs, even if the Act expired).
153. See Schnaiberg, Calif. Board Revises Policy for LEP Students, supra note 152, at
25 (stating that the Board adopted a new policy providing schools with more flexibility and
that the state legislature was considering a bill that would grant each district flexibility to
determine how to help its own LEP students).
154. S.B. 6, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Calif. 1998) available at <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/
pub/97-98/bill/sen/sb_0001-0050/sb 6_bill 19980504_enrolled.html> (visited Jan. 24, 1999).
155. See id.
156. Id. This bill maintains the voluntariness of enrollment in a bilingual program, but
also requires schools to notify parents about a student's language skills and to discuss the
various programs available. See id. To provide school districts with the materials for such
a discussion, the bill requires the state Department of Education to compile research
about the teaching methods and provide this research to school districts annually. See id.
Like the Bilingual-Bicultural Education Act of 1976, this reform act contains a sunset pro-
vision, in this case, January 1, 2008. See id.; see also supra note 151 (citing the sunset pro-
vision of the Bilingual-Bicultural Education Act of 1976).
157. See generally Proposition 227, 1998 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 227 (West) (codified at
CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 300-340) (West Supp. 1999) (mandating that all children in public
schools be taught English through a limited immersion method).
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lingual education, the voter initiative mandates that all children, who are
English learners, be taught English through a limited immersion pro-
158
gram.
The origins of the Proposition, which passed by a margin of sixty-one
to thirty-nine percent,'59 can be found in the predominantly Spanish-
speaking garment district of Los Angeles. For two weeks in 1996, par-
ents of Hispanic students kept their children out of the local elementary
school to protest the predominantly Spanish-language instruction of their
children.16  While the school did introduce English slowly to the stu-
dents, the parents wanted the children in English-language classes.162 In
the parents' eyes, many of whom speak little or no English, the only way
for their children to succeed and move beyond jobs in garment factories
and as street vendors is to learn English. 16' To that end, the parents re-
quested repeatedly that the school district move the students into Eng-
lish-language settings, a legal request under California law.' 1  When the
school district failed to comply with the requests, the parents pulled their
children out of school.
165
The boycott caught the attention of Ron Unz, a multimillionaire who
158. See CAL EDUC. CODE § 305. The limited immersion program is designed to last
for one year, under normal circumstances. See id. In addition, the grouping of students in
the immersion classes is based solely on language ability. See id. Schools are encouraged
to mix speakers of differing native languages and are allowed to place different age groups
in the same immersion class. See id. As the students develop a working knowledge of
English, they are to be mainstreamed into regular classrooms. See id.
159. See Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1012 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
160. See Michael Bazeley & Lori Aratani, English Initiative's Spanish-Speaking Roots:
How Latino Parents' Boycott of a Log Angeles School Led to a Statewide 'Proposal to
Scrap Bilingual Education, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, March 22, 1998, at IA, available
in <http://www.mercurycenter.com/resources/search/#newslibrary>. (The archive site is a
fee-based service. To retrieve an article from the archives, registration is required with the
site at a charge of $1.95 per article. The first two paragraphs are available without
charge.) Critics of the programs claim that the catalyst-Ron Unz-is using the bilingual
education issue to gain name recognition, possibly for a future run for political office. See
Fitzgerald, supra note 152, at 48.
161. See Bazeley & Aratani, supra note 160 at 1A.
162. See id. Children who switched into the English classrooms after the boycott say
they prefer learning in English to learning in Spanish. See id.
163. See id. Many of the parents themselves worked in factory jobs for low wages. See
id.
164. See id.; see also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52161 (West 1989) (stating that participation
in bilingual education programs is voluntary).
165. See Bazeley and Aratani, supra note 160, at IA. The boycott was held in Febru-
ary, and two weeks later, the school district agreed to place the children in English-
language classes beginning the following fall. See id. The children who were moved ap-
peared to prefer the English-language classes, claiming a better understanding of what oc-
curred in school. See id.
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made a failed bid for the 1994 Republican gubernatorial nomination,
losing to then-Governor Pete Wilson.66 In that bid, Unz spoke out
against Proposition 187, which denied benefits to illegal immigrants, ar-••• 167
guing that the measure was divisive. While some say Proposition 227 is
equally divisive,'m Unz claims support among prominent Hispanic educa-
tors,'169 including campaign co-chair Gloria Matta Tuchman, a Mexican
American teacher,170 and Jaime Escalante, the inspiration for the movie
"Stand and Deliver."
17
'
Unz believes that bilingual education does not teach students Eng-
lish. As support for his position, he points to the low test scores and
general poor achievement of students in California's traditional bilingual
education programs. 7 1 Unz cites statistics that suggest that only five per-
cent of children in the bilingual programs transfer to English-language
classrooms each year, leaving most students unable to read and write in
English.
71
Opponents on both sides of bilingual education, however, rely on sta-
tistics to support their respective arguments, frequently relying on the
same statistics.' Bilingual education supporters point to studies showing
that LEP students in the transitional bilingual programs score better on
166. See Frank Bruni, The California Entrepreneur Who Beat Bilingual Teaching, N.Y.
TIMES, June 14, 1998, at Al. Unz would seem to be an unlikely leader for a measure to
overhaul the California education system, because he is unmarried and has no children.
See id. In fact, critics attacked Unz, stating that he was using Proposition 227 to remain in
the political arena, and possibly for another gubernatorial race. See Fitzgerald, supra note
152, at 48.
167. See Bruni, supra note 166, at Al. Proposition 187 ultimately passed but has not
taken effect due to legal challenges. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See Bilingual Education: Separate and Unequal, THE ECONOMIST, August 30,
1997, at 16.
171. See Phil Garcia, Star Latino Teacher Joins Bilingual Foes, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Oct. 16, 1997, at Al. Escalante said that he agreed to serve as honorary chairman of Unz's
campaign due to his experience as an immigrant who learned English. See id. Escalante
believes that bilingual education leads to a feeling of inferiority and is a negative factor for
immigrant children. See id.
172. See Bruni, supra note 166, at Al.
173. See id.
174. See Bilingual Education: Separate and Unequal, supra note 170, at 17.
175. See, e.g., Bazeley and Aratani, supra note 160, at 1A (citing statistics comparing
students in native language programs to students in English-language programs and ex-
plaining that bilingual education proponents and opponents use the same statistics to bol-
ster their own arguments); Schnaiberg, In Battle Over Prop. 227, Both Sides Command
Armies of Statistics, supra note 13, at 17 (citing a Los Angeles school district comparison
report that both proponents and opponents cite for support).
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standardized tests than do students in English-language classrooms,
while opponents cite the fact that neither group has a high overall success
rate."' Critics have complained that in a Los Angeles School District re-
port, the district downplayed the fact that fewer students in the transi-
tional program took the English literacy tests because the district
deemed the students were not ready. 177  Another statistic frequently
pointed to by critics of bilingual education involves the dropout rates of
Hispanic students.178 Polls taken before the June vote, which showed
81% of Hispanic parents want their children to learn English as soon as
possible1 79 and that 84% of California's Hispanic voters favored Proposi-
tion 227;180 however, post-vote results showed that Hispanic voters in fact
voted against the Measure, two-to-one18
B. Sometimes You Do Get What You Want: Proposition 227's Provisions
for Quick English
The goal of Proposition 227 is simple enough: "all children in Califor-
nia public schools shall be taught English as rapidly and effectively as
176. See Bazeley and Aratani, supra note 160, at 1A. In a recent study, the Los An-
geles school district examined standardized test scores for nearly 6000 students who had
remained in the same school from first until fifth grade. See id. Students in the transi-
tional bilingual program scored at the 28th and 33rd percentiles in reading and math re-
spectively. See id. Students in the English-language programs scored in the 21st and 26th
percentiles respectively on the same tests. See id. Critics pointed out that students who
moved from school to school were not included in the sample. See id.
177. See id.; Schnaiberg, In Battle Over Prop. 227, Both Sides Command Armies of
Statistics, supra note 13, at 17. Only 61% of fifth graders enrolled in the bilingual classes
took the test, whereas 97% of those in English-language classes took the test. See id. The
testing policy called for students in the bilingual classes to take the test only if the students
were reading at a fifth grade level in English. See id. Students in the English classes were
required to take the tests if they had attended a U.S. school for at least 30 months. See id.
178. See Schnaiberg, In Battle Over Prop. 227, Both Sides Command Armies of Statis-
tics, supra note 13, at 17. The dropout rate for Hispanic students in California in 1995-96
was 5.6%, compared to California's overall dropout rate of 3.9%. See id. However, com-
parisons of dropout rates between students in different bilingual programs are not tracked.
See id.
179. See Bilingual Education: Separate and Unequal, supra note 170, at 16 (citing a poll
by the Center for Equal Opportunity, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank); see also
RICAHRD LOPEZ, BILINGUAL EUCATION: SEPARATING FACT FROM FICTION 4-5 (Na-
tional Assoc. for Bilingual Education Report, Sept. 18, 1995). The report cites a Los
ANGELES TIMES poll finding that more than 80% of Hispanics favor bilingual education.
See id. at 4. The report further states that polls showing Hispanics opposing bilingual edu-
cation result from the phrasing of the questions, such as teaching "Spanish at the expense
of English." Id.
180. See Garcia, supra note 171, at Al (citing a Los ANGELES TIMES poll).
181. See Michelle Locke, Telegraph, FRESNO BEE, Dec. 20, 1998, at A4, available in
1998 WL 21611209.
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possible."' 82 To obtain this goal, the Proposition, as codified, mandates
that all students are to be placed in English language classrooms, and
that LEP students are to be placed in immersion programs not to exceed
one year under normal circumstances."'
Exceptions, or waivers, may be provided under certain conditions with
written consent of a student's parent or guardian, after a personal re-
quest by the parent or guardian. 8"' There are three waivable conditions:
where the child already knows English as demonstrated through stan-
dardized test scores, where the child is older than age ten and the school
administrators believe another method would be better suited for teach-
ing English to the particular child, or where the child has identified, spe-
cial needs that would be better addressed through a different teaching
method. 88 If the child receives a waiver, he or she may be placed in a
traditional bilingual education program. 186 Where twenty or more stu-
dents in a single grade at a single school have received waivers, the
school is required to provide a bilingual class or to allow the students to
187transfer to a school offering such classes.
The Proposition also establishes standing for a parent to sue if a child
has been denied the option of an English-language program. 18 This en-
forcement section allows parents to sue any teacher, administrator, or
elected official who "willfully and repeatedly refuses" to provide educa-
tion in English to children in violation of Proposition 227.189 Officials
sued under this provision may be held personally liable for actual dam-
ages and attorney's fees.19° In addition, Proposition 227 allows for
amendment only through referendum or a two-thirds vote in the legisla-
182. Proposition 227, 1998 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 227, § 300(f) (West) (codified at
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1999)).
183. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 305 (West Supp. 1999). An English language classroom
is one where the teacher(s) use English to teach. See id. § 306(b). An immersion class is
one where instruction is in English but is designed for students learning English. See id. §
306(d).
184. See id. § 310.
185. See id. § 311. Children testing out of the immersion program must score at or
above the lower of either the state average for the enrolled grade level, or the fifth grade
level. See id. § 311(a). Special needs are those physical, emotional, psychological, or edu-
cational needs identified by the school after the child has been in an immersion program
for at least 30 days. See id. § 311(c). Parents of special need children are not required to
agree to the program waiver." See id.
186. See id. § 310.
187. See id.
188. See id. § 320.
189. See id.
190. See id. The measure specifically prohibits the awarding of punitive or consequen-
tial damages. See id.
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ture, and it contains a severance clause that allows the main provisions to
continue in force if any single provision is invalidated.'9 '
C. Not As Written: Opponents Attack Before the Ink Is Dry
Within twenty-four hours of the Proposition's passage, several LEP
students moved for a preliminary injunction in federal district court on
federal statutory and constitutional grounds.9 ' In Valeria G. v. Wilson,'9
the LEP students claimed that the Proposition violated four laws: Title
VI, the EEOA, and the Equal Protection and Supremacy Clauses of the
Constitution.'94 At the time the suit was filed, no school had imple-
mented the mandate of Proposition 227.'9' As a result, the plaintiffs had
to argue the measure was facially invalid; that is, the initiative could not
be implemented validly in any circumstance, a challenge the district court
noted as exceedingly difficult to win.'96
The court first addressed the EEOA claim. 97 To constitute a violation,
Proposition 227 had to be found not to be "appropriate action" under
§ 1703(f). 9 8 Finding no definition of "appropriate action" in the statu-
tory language or legislative history, nor even in the Ninth Circuit, the
court turned to Castaneda I for a definition.! Following the Fifth Cir-
cuit's analysis in Castaneda I, the district court found that Proposition
227 did not directly violate the EEOA,2°° and then applied the three-
191. See id. §§ 325, 335.
192. See Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1012 (N.D. Cal. 1998). In addition,
five groups filed amicis curiae briefs in support of the plaintiffs, while several parties
joined the defendants in opposition to the motion for an injunction. See id.
193. 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
194. See id. at 1015.
195. See id.
196. See id. (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). In consider-
ing the motion for the injunction, the court had to consider whether the children could
demonstrate a likelihood of winning the case on the merits and whether they would be
harmed if an injunction was not granted. See id. at 1014. The court also was faced with
the question of whether the claim was ripe. See id. at 1015. Under Article III of the Con-
stitution, courts cannot offer advisory opinions; therefore, to prove ripeness, the plaintiffs
had to demonstrate injury or alleged injury so imminent and inevitable as to justify inter-
vention. See id. at 1015-16 (setting out the "ripeness" standard).
197. See id. at 1016.
198. See id. at 1017; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (1994) (requiring states "to take ap-
propriate action to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation" by stu-
dents).
199. See Valeria G., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1016-17.
200. See id. The district court relied extensively on the Castaneda I court's analysis of
statutory language, and it found no federal requirement for providing bilingual programs.
See id.; see also supra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing how Castaneda I
reached its holding that there was no congressional mandate for bilingual education).
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pronged test for "appropriate action. ,,20 In resolving the first prong, the
requirement of a sound educational theory, the court found conflicting
evidence presented by both sides.' °2 This conflicting evidence demon-
strated the acute disagreement among authorities on educational theo-
ries and the court declined to choose one over the other.
Application of the second prong resulted in a similar fate. ' On the is-
sue of whether the California schools had a program to implement the
adopted theory, the plaintiffs claimed that Proposition 227 failed to
specify methods of student assessment, left them with limited flexibility,
and failed to establish teaching standards and requirements.20 ' Again, the
timing of the challenge caused problems for the court, as it found that al-
though the plaintiffs' allegations were true, the Proposition had not been
implemented and nothing in the language of Proposition 227 prevented
the schools from implementing the standards and testing mechanisms
that the plaintiffs claimed were necessary. 206 Reaching the third prong,
examining the results of a program, the court found no results to evalu-
ate and also found no language in the measure indicating California
could not or would not evaluate the results.20
The court then proceeded to the Title VI question.28 The students
charged that Proposition 227 discriminated against them based on their
national origin, an impact prohibited by Title VIV 9  Citing Lau and
201. See Valeria G., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1017-18; see also supra note 140 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the "appropriate action" test developed by the Fifth Circuit).
202. See id. at 1018. Plaintiffs presented expert opinions that the sheltered English
immersion program/mainstream English program is an unsound educational theory. See
id. The defendants countered with evidence that the Proposition 227-structured English
immersion program is already in place in various United States school districts and indeed
is the main teaching method for immigrant children in much of the Western World. See id.
203. See id. at 1018-19. The court continued by addressing the students' concern that
the immersion program would not fulfill the EEOA obligations of teaching a substantive
curriculum. See id. at 1019. The court stated that, without a curriculum in place, such a
judgment could not be rendered. See id. The court explained that § 1703(f) allows schools
to determine how to approach the dual issues of teaching children English and teaching
substantive courses, as long as the programs are designed to do both. See id.
204. See id. at 1020-21.
205. See id. at 1020.
206. See id. The court found judging the program at this stage to be premature. See
id. With regard to the flexibility issue, the court cited the waiver provisions of Proposition
227 and the local schools' flexibility in granting the waivers in concluding that the provi-
sions would allow schools to respond to individual needs or program weaknesses through
legally permissible means. See id.; see also supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Proposition 227's waiver provisions).
207. See Valeria G., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1021.
208. See id. at 1022.
209. See id.
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Bakke, the court found disparate rulings on the standard required in Ti-
tle VI claims."" The court, however, found that a different standard ap-
plied to claims arising under regulations implementing Title VI, as op-
posed to claims arising under Title VI itself.211  Under this second
standard, challengers need not prove an intent to discriminate, but need
only prove that the effect of the act or legislation is discriminatory.212 Ul-
timately, the court stated that the standard did not matter to the resolu-
tion of this case because the students had not argued discriminatory in-
tent and, due to the lack of implementation, were unlikely to prove a
discriminatory effect.
213
With respect to the equal protection claim, the students did not try to
challenge Proposition 227 program prescriptions, but rather its amenda-
214tory provisions. The plaintiffs argued that the amendatory process dis-
advantages LEP students in that it makes California's English education
policy more difficult to change than other educational programs, thus
denying these students equal protection.2 ' The court found no equal
protection violation because Proposition 227's amendatory process im-
pairs only access to bilingual education, which is not a constitutional
116
right. Further, the court could find no discriminatory intent underlying
the amendment process, as LEP students can petition local school boards
under the built-in exceptions to Proposition 227.217 Lastly, the court said
that even if the amendatory process were unconstitutional, due to Propo-
sition 227's severance clause, only that portion would be struck; the re-
211
maining provisions would remain in place.
210. See id. at 1022-23; see also supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing the
holding in Bakke, that Title VI is coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause and thus
requires a showing of discriminatory intent); supra note 113 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Lau's holding that discriminatory effect was the appropriate standard).
211. See Valeria G., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1023. The court stated that the Ninth Circuit,
and more recent Supreme Court decisions, allowed injunctive or declarative relief under
Title VI regulations where discriminatory effect was shown. See id.; see also Guardians
Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 607 (1983) (holding injunctive
relief is appropriate for unintentional discrimination).
212. See Valeria G., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1023. The court used this standard because the
students also alleged a violation of Title VI implementing regulations. See id.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 1023-24. Proposition 227, as codified, contains its own amending proce-
dure. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 335 (West Supp. 1999). Under section 335, the Proposi-
tion can be amended only by a two-thirds vote in the state legislature or through a voter
referendum. See id.
215. See Valeria G., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1023-24.
216. See id. at 1024.
217. See id. at 1025.
218. See id.; see also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 325 (West Supp. 1999) (providing that any
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The court also found the plaintiffs' Supremacy Clause argument un-
likely to succeed.219 Relying on Castaneda I for support, the court held
that because Congress's passage of the EEOA did not mandate bilingual
education, nothing prevented states from denying bilingual education.
The court then conceded that Congress may have favored bilingual edu-
cation, because it had provided grant money to schools offering bilingual
education through the Bilingual Education Act of 1974; however, Con-
gress did not require it.221 All that is required, the court held, is "appro-
priate action.
' 222
In closing, the court returned to the fact that the plaintiffs' complaint
was a facial challenge and not based on actual injury.223 In the request for
an injunction against Proposition 227's implementation, the court said
the plaintiffs had shown only the possibility of statutory and constitu-
tional violations. 24 These possibilities, the court said, are not enough to
invalidate an unimplemented statute.22' Though the challenge, therefore,
was not ripe for a decision on the merits, the court acknowledged the
possibility of a challenge when the measure is implemented under as "as-
applied" standard.226
D. That Settles That???: Disparate Rulings and Waivers Leave
Proposition 227's Effect Uncertain Within California
Less than one month after U.S. District Judge Charles A. Legge issued
his ruling in Valeria G., Judge Ronald M. Whyte, also in the Northern
District of California, issued a temporary injunction forbidding the im-
plementation of Proposition 227 in the San Jose School District. Citing
a 1994 federal desegregation order, Judge Whyte's order allowed the
school district to continue its dual immersion program without changing
part of Proposition 227 found in conflict with federal or state law shall be severed, leaving
the remaining provisions intact).
219. See Valeria G., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1021-22.
220. See id.; see also supra note 138 and accompanying text (explaining that bilingual
education is not congressionally mandated).
221. See Valeria G., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1022.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 1026 (addressing the issue of ripeness and the requirements for a facial
challenge of statutory language).
224. See id. (describing the relief plaintiffs sought as "anticipatory").
225. See id. (citing Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n., 675 F.2d
1282, 1289-90 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
226. See id.
227. See id. at 1011; Lori Aratani, Reprieve for S.J. School Program: Bilingual Teach-
ing to Continue While Conflict Resolved, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 18,1998, at 1B;
U.S. Judge Rejects English-Only Measure, supra note 33, at A18.
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its curriculum.22 8 The dual-immersion program at River Glen School, in
the San Jose School District, has received national awards for teaching
students to become fluent in both Spanish and English.229 Whyte's order
only addressed Spanish-speaking students, however, because the federal
desegregation order was directed only at Hispanic students. Other
non-English speakers will be forced into the immersion programs man-
231dated by Proposition 227. In addition, because Whyte's order is only
temporary, the school board's trustees at San Jose's River Glen School
District have applied to the California Board of Education for a perma-
nent waiver from Proposition 227.232 To receive a permanent waiver, the
San Jose School District has sought an exemption through the California
Education Code, which allows the establishment of "alternative
schools. ,,233
Parents of River Glen students are eager to retain the award-winning
dual-immersion program, which, like others of its kind, has been ex-
tremely successful. 234  The idea behind dual-language immersion is to
group both native and non-native English speakers in a class from an
early age, usually kindergarten, and teach them in two languages. 23' The
goal of the program is to produce students that are fluent in both lan-
228. See Aratani, supra note 227, at lB.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See id. (citing Vietnamese and Portuguese-speaking students as those whose
needs still must be addressed).
232. See Lori Aratani, School To Seek New Status, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug.
21, 1998, at lB.
233. See id. To qualify as an alternative school, the school must be open to all stu-
dents, not just those in the district, and teachers must choose voluntarily to work at the
school. See id. An alternative school waiver would allow the school to maintain its dual-
immersion program should Judge Whyte's order be reversed. See id. In September, the
state Board of Education decided to delay ruling on all district waivers, citing its appeal of
the order to hear waiver requests. See Lori Aratani, Prop. 227-Waiver Pleas Put on Hold,
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 12, 1998, at 6B.
234. See Aratani, School To Seek New Status, supra note 232, at lB.
235. See Jeremy D. Marcus, Note, Educating Immigrant Children: To What End?, 10
GEO. IMMGR. L.J. 485, 494-96 (1996) (describing various bilingual teaching methods and
their goals and proposing a debate about those goals to decide the appropriate methodol-
ogy). Learning English as quickly as possible is not the only goal in all bilingual teaching
methodologies. See id. at 496. While the goal of English-as-a-second-language programs
is the rapid development of English language capabilities, programs such as Transitional
Bilingual Education have the added goal of the development of the native language and
culture. See id. at 496-97. Until one goal is determined to be the appropriate goal of
school bilingual education, the debate about any methodology's efficacy is meaningless,
because no common desired result exists. See id. at 499.
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guages and knowledgeable about both cultures.236 In fact, a George Ma-
son University study showed that graduates of dual-language immersion
programs receive higher test scores than either students in other bilingual
programs or native English speakers from English-only classrooms.237
Not surprisingly, other dual-language immersion programs in Califor-
nia have also sought waivers from Proposition 227. In applying for the
waivers, school districts may apply for district-wide, "blanket" waivers or
for waivers for limited programs.29 Despite initial indications to the con-
trary,40 the State's Board of Education has considered granting Proposi-
tion 227 waivers to school districts, at least within the context of dual-
2411immersion or similar alternative programs.
IV. IS THE CURE WORSE THAN THE DISEASE? EFFECTS OF
PROPOSITION 227
A. Beyond the Borders
•. .• 242
To borrow a phrase, when California acts, people pay attention.
California's passage of Proposition 227 is expected to draw its fair share
of attention as other states consider restructuring or overhauling their re-
236. See id. at 495.
237. See Hornblower, supra note 24, at 49 (citing a 13-year study by two George Ma-
son University professors examining the performance of 42,000 non-English speaking stu-
dents); Anika M. Scott, Dual-Language Classes Aim for a Broader Bilingualism,
CHICAGO TRIB., Sept. 16, 1998, § 2, at 3 (citing the same study). The study found that
students who received six years of bilingual education performed better than students who
had been transferred out of bilingual classes sooner, even where classroom aides and addi-
tional English training were provided to such students. See Hornblower, supra note 24, at
49.
238. See Tuinstra et al., supra note 34, at Al. Two Orange County, California schools
received waivers from the state school system. See id. As in the San Jose school system,
the two Orange County schools will provide dual-immersion programs, where instruction
is in both Spanish and English. See id.
239. See Michael Bazeley, Waiver Pleas Will Be Heard, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Sept. 3, 1998, at lB.
240. See Edgar Sanchez, Bilingual Education Waivers Are Ruled Out, SACRAMENTO
BEE, June 27, 1998, at A3. The state Board of Education initially stated that it would not
consider issuing waivers from Proposition 227 to local school districts. See id. The Board
based its initial decision on advice from its attorney and the passage at the polls of Propo-
sition 227, claiming it represented "the will of the people." Id. The general counsel to the
state Education Department, however, had told the board that such waivers were legally
possible. See id.
241. See Bazeley, supra note 239, at 1B; Defao & Maxwell, supra note 35, at Al.
242. See Schnaiberg, Will Calif.'s Bellwether Reputation Ring True?, supra note 23, at 6
(quoting Brenda Welburn, executive director of the National Association of State Boards
of Education).
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spective bilingual education programs. Arizona already has its own
chapter of English for the Children, the organization that successfully
sponsored Proposition 227 in California.244 Ron Unz, the millionaire be-
hind the California group, has expressed interest in the Arizona group,
and has spoken to other groups in Colorado, Texas, Washington, and
New York.245
Even Congress noted Proposition 227 in its reports on H.R. 3892, the
English Language Fluency Act (ELFA).246 The purpose of the bill is to
amend the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA),
including the sections amended by the Bilingual Education Act of 1974.247
The ELFA would change the current funding procedures for bilingual
education from directed grants to block grants, and would permit stu-
dents to remain in federally funded bilingual education programs for a
maximum of three years.24' Although the ELFA has been passed in the
House of Representatives, a Senate vote is not expected until the Spring
• 249
of 1999 when the ESEA is scheduled for reauthorization.
While Proposition 227 demonstrates the current interest in bilingual
education, the Measure's value as a predictor of action in other states is
less certain.2 0  According to Marcelo Gaete, Director of Constituent
243. See id. Several states, including Arizona, New Jersey, and Massachusetts, are
considering revising their bilingual education programs. See id. California's vote may
force legislators to speed up action on the issue, to avoid being perceived as ignoring it.
See id.
244. See Sara Tully Tapia, Statewide Push To Kill Bilingual Education Gains, ARIZ.
DAILY STAR, Aug. 2, 1998, at lB.
245. See id.
246. See H.R. REP. No. 105-587, at 15 (1998) (citing the vote on Proposition 227 as
evidence of state interest in the education policies for LEP students), available in 1998 WL
323239.
247. See id. at 1, 14. Section 1 of the bill states that it is amending Title VII of the
ESEA, which is the BEA. See id. at 1. The report summary states a need to reform spe-
cifically the Bilingual Education Act. See id. at 14.
248. See id. at 19, 88. Block grants would not be targeted at specific schools or school
systems, but rather would give funds to the state in lump sums. See id. at 88.
249. See Bilingual Ed. Legislation Passes House, supra note 26, at 24 (discussing the
bill's passage in the House of Representatives and its future in the Senate). If the ELFA is
approved in the Senate, it will need to be resubmitted to the House for reconsideration
because the House of Representatives is not a continuing body. See 145 CONG. REC.
H212 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999) (statement of Rep. Hyde) (stating that the House of Repre-
sentatives is not a continuing body; thus the current session, the 106th Congress, must re-
consider legislation continued from the previous session of Congress, the 105th Congress).
250. Compare Schnaiberg, Will Calif.'s Bellwether Reputation Ring True?, supra note
23, at 6 (quoting legislative aides from states that are considering bilingual education re-
form, but do not support a 227-like measure), with Tully Tapia, supra note 2444, at 1B
(stating that in Arizona, the local English for the Children chapter hoped to replace that
state's bilingual education programs with an English immersion program similar to the
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Services for the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed
Officials, California often sets the standard for how others act.251 In
states like Massachusetts and Texas, however, where efforts are under-
way to reform bilingual education, indications exist that changes in those
12
states are unlikely to be as extensive as the changes in California. In
fact, recruiters from Arlington, Texas visited California districts to re-
cruit bilingual teachers looking for a less restrictive teaching environ-
ment.253
B. Judicial Effects
Even if Proposition 227 does not spawn copycat legislation across the
country, its impact has been, and will continue to be, felt in judicial chal-
254 255lenges. If Proposition 227 ultimately is upheld, future bilingual edu-
cation challenges could be limited significantly. In ruling on the meas-
ure, the court necessarily would have to decide whether the minimal
bilingual provisions satisfy all of the statutory and constitutional viola-
tions alleged by the plaintiffs, thereby establishing precedent for future
court challenges."
program in California).
251. See Schnaiberg, Will Calif.'s Bellwether Reputation Ring True?, supra note 23, at
6.
252. See id. (quoting legislative assistants stating that Proposition 227-like measures
are unlikely in Massachusetts or Texas). But see Jordana Hart, State Board Vote Worries
Bilingual Education Advocates, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 12, 1998, at B1 (citing Massachus-
setts Board of Education approval of a proposal to limit bilingual education to one year
and allow local school districts determine the teaching methodology), available in 1998
WL 22235384.
253. See Schnaiberg, Will Calif.'s Bellwether Reputation Ring True?, supra note 23, at
6.
254. See supra Part III.C-D (discussing the lawsuit challenging Proposition 227 and
court actions brought by schools and school districts requesting waivers from the imple-
mentation of Proposition 227); cf Rachel F. Moran, Bilingual Education as a Status Con-
flict, 75 CAL. L. REV. 321, 357-360 (1987) (stating that historically, bilingual education
proponents have relied on litigation to ensure adequate funding, but that tensions between
various minority language groups can result in inefficient litigation).
255. See Tully Tapia, supra note 244, at 1B (observing that the Ninth Circuit upheld
the Northern District's denial of an injunction).
256. See generally Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1015 (N.D. Cal. 1998)
(listing the plaintiffs' claims under the EEOA, the Supremacy Clause, Title VI, and the
Equal Protection Clause). Traditionally, bilingual education claims have arisen from the
Equal Protection Clause, Title VI, the EEOA, and the Bilingual Education Act. See Hyun
An, supra note 7, at 135-36. Valeria G. addressed these bases plus the Supremacy Clause,
and held that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed in proving that the language of Propo-
sition 227 violated any of them. See Valeria G., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1021-25. In so doing,
Valeria G. tied together what, in caselaw, had been previously presented as separate ar-
guments in favor of bilingual education (EEOA, Title VI, and Equal Protection). The
court upheld Castaneda I, which said the EEOA does not mandate bilingual education,
1999]
Catholic University Law Review
The possibility of further litigation on the validity of the measure exists
because the Valeria G. court did not reach the merits of Proposition
227.257 In addition to the attacks on the legality of Proposition 227 itself
and the legal challenges to obtain waivers, Proposition 227 has a provi-
sion allowing parents to sue teachers, administrators, and school board
members for denying instruction in the English language. 2", The threat of
suits is potentially acute because the language of the statute is unclear in
its requirement that students be taught "nearly all ...in English."25 9
Consequently, school districts have interpreted the statute to require
260anywhere from 60% to 90% English instruction.
Suits also could arise after the first year of the Proposition's implemen-
tation, because the measure calls for the mainstreaming of bilingual stu-
dents into classes with English-speaking students after they acquire a
working grasp of English, ideally within one year.26' The definitional sec-
tion of Proposition 227 does not define "working knowledge";2 62 there-
but instead requires only "appropriate action." See id. at 1016-18. The court also applied
the Castaneda I test to determine whether Proposition 227's language provided "appropri-
ate action." See id. at 1018-21. The Valeria G. court also followed Castaneda I, Washing-
ton, and Bakke in stating that a showing of discriminatory intent probably is necessary to
find discrimination under Title VI. See id. at 1022-23. The court also noted that the stu-
dents' Equal Protection claim attacked only the amendatory process of the Proposition,
not its substantive provisions. See id. at 1023-24.
Notwithstanding the holding in Valeria G., the Supreme Court has shown its own reluc-
tance to use the Equal Protection Clause in the education realm. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982) (reaching the equal protection issue, but refusing to state a level
of review higher than rationality); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974) (refusing to
reach the Equal Protection claim when a basis could be found in Title VI).
257. See Valeria G. 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1026. The court pointed out that once Proposi-
tion 227 was implemented, plaintiffs could challenge the measure for the same statutory
and constitutional violations alleged in the injunction request only under an "as-applied"
theory. See id.
258. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 320 (West Supp. 1.999) (providing standing for parents
to sue to enforce Proposition 227). The measure further provides personal liability for
violations, but limits recovery to actual damages and attorney's costs. See id.
259. See id. §§ 305-06 (requiring that students who are not native English speakers be
placed in "sheltered English immersion" classes where "nearly all classroom instruction is
in English").
260. See Schools Use Bilingual-Education Law's Flexibility, FRESNO BEE, Sept. 3,
1998, at A3 (citing specific school districts that have interpreted the "nearly all" require-
ment differently); Michelle Locke, An AP California Centerpiece, AP POL. SERV., Oct. 11,
1998 (citing similar statistics), available in 1998 WL 7453731. Alice Callaghan, a propo-
nent of the measure, stated that no school districts were complying with Proposition 227
and that "It's going to take the California Supreme Court to make school districts in Cali-
fornia comply." See id.
261. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 305.
262. See id. § 306 (defining various terms including "English learner" and "English
language classroom," but not "working knowledge").
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fore, the interpretation of that language could lead to suits under the
measure's parental enforcement provision.
6 1
If Proposition 227 ultimately is upheld,26' it will serve as a model for
states that want limited bilingual programs; this phenomenon may result
in similar uncertainties around the country that will require court inter-
vention to decide. Ironically, such court intervention in education is
exactly what the Fifth Circuit was trying to avoid in establishing the
Castaneda I guidelines, which defer to determinations made by local
school officials.266
C. Effects on Students
One potential effect of Proposition 227 may be higher dropout rates.267
Studies cited by courts have shown that when a student is taught in a lan-
guage different from that used at home, a tendency exists for the student
to begin to feel that one language is inferior.268 If the home language be-
comes the inferior language, this belief may manifest itself in rebellion
269
against learning or using the new language.
263. See Dennis Love, Prop. 227 Poses Questions Even for the Old Pros, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., Aug. 19, 1998, at Metro p.1 (quoting a school official as saying the current
program in his school fits a liberal definition of mainstreaming). The assistant superinten-
dent for the Orange Unified School District expressed confidence that the district's cur-
rent program complied with Proposition 227. See id. He was less certain about next year
when the mainstreaming provision takes effect, questioning what the measure's language
meant. See id.
264. See Tully Tapia, supra note 244, at 1B (observing that the Ninth Circuit upheld
the Northern District's denial of an injunction).
265. See generally Karen Lam, Rethinking Bilingual Education, A. MAG., Sept. 30,
1998, at 35, (citing fears of bilingual education supporters, that California could be a bell-
wether state) available in 1998 WL 12447162; Schnaiberg, Will Calif.'s Bellwether Reputa-
tion Ring True?, supra note 23, at 6 (discussing California's influence on other states).
266. See Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1009 (5th Cir. 1981) (Castaneda 1) (stating
that courts are not equipped to analyze educational policy and that in applying the guide-
lines, courts should determine only soundness of a theory, not its merits).
267. See Schnaiberg, In Battle Over Prop. 227, Both Sides Command Armies of Statis-
tics, supra note 13, at 17 (stating that critics of bilingual education point to high dropout
rates under traditional bilingual education programs as evidence that such programs do
not work); LOPEZ, supra note 179, at 5 (arguing that most LEP students are not in bilin-
gual education programs; therefore, such programs cannot be the cause of the high drop-
out rates).
268. See Martin Luther King Jr. Elem. Sch. Children v. Ann Arbor Sch. Dist. Bd., 473
F. Supp. 1371, 1377-78 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (citing studies that show that a barrier develops
when the students' home language is not considered in teaching a different language, es-
pecially if the student feels the home language is inferior); see also Hyun An, supra note 7,
at 152-53 (stating that English-only classes may result in children feeling that either their
home language or English is inferior).
269. See Martin Luther King Jr. Elem. Sch. Children, 473 F. Supp. at 1377.
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As students grow up and become involved in extracurricular activities,
boredom may set in, as the benefits of learning a new language become
less apparent."" Additionally, even if LEP students graduate from the
immersion program into mainstream classes, research indicates that one
year of immersion instruction is not enough.271 Consequently, students
may be unable to continue in school due to a lack of understanding, or
may graduate without the skills needed to succeed in the economy.272
Such results are the exact opposite of the ones promised by Proposition
271227 supporters.
Another effect of more segregated immersion classes is that less un-
derstanding will develop between English-speaking students and LEP
students.271 Proposition 227 establishes that LEP students will be placed
in immersion classes for up to one year.2 75 During that time, students in
the immersion classes will be taught English, as well as their substantive
courses, within the confines of the immersion class.21' After acquiring a
"working knowledge of English, 277 students will be mainstreamed into
270. See id. (citing an expert witness's testimony that after fourth grade, extracurricu-
lar activities begin to compete with coursework for a student's time, which may result in
loss of interest in developing reading skills).
271. See COUNCIL OF THE GREAT CITY SCHOOLS, CALIFORNIA'S PROPOSITION 227:
IMPLICATIONS AND COSTS OF THE UNZ INITIATIVE, Part III, § C (finding that students
who fail to acquire necessary language skills will fall behind their English-speaking peers)
(visited Jan. 21, 1999) available at <http://www.cgcs.org/reports/1998/Unz.htm>.
272. See id. (stating that as students fall behind they may not develop needed skills and
may be placed in other programs for remedial learning, while never being mainstreamed);
Virginia P. Collier, Acquiring a Second Language for School, DIRECTIONS IN LANG. &
EDUC. (Nat'l Clearinghouse for Bilingual Educ., Washington, D.C.), Fall 1995, at 6 (stat-
ing that if students do not achieve literacy in their primary language, the students may also
have difficulties in the secondary language).
273. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 300(d), (f) (West Supp. 1999) (stating that the current
bilingual system is failing and resulting in high dropout rates, and therefore should be re-
placed). Mid-year interviews conducted with teachers and school administrators have
yielded guardedly optimistic reports. See, e.g.,. John Gittelsohn & Elizabeth Chey, True-
blue Believers Now in English-only Schools, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Feb. 3, 1999 at Al,
available in 1999 WL 428724; Louis Sahagun, L.A. Students Take to English Immersion,
LOS ANGELES TIMES, Jan. 13, 1999, at Al, available in 1999 WL 2120212 (reporting posi-
tive reports from teachers implementing Prop. 227). However, administrators have ex-
pressed concerns that students may need more than the one-year immersion class and the
threat of mass student retentions. See Gittelsohn & Chey, supra. Final opinions are being
held until California administers its standardized tests in the Spring of 1999. See id.; Saha-
gun, supra.
274. See Marcus, supra note 235, at 503-04 (discussing the benefit of interaction be-
tween students of different cultures and the effect of limiting that interaction).
275. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 305 (providing a temporary transition period not to ex-
ceed one year in normal circumstances for students learning English).
276. See id. §§ 305, 306(d).
277. Id. § 305.
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regular English-language classes.
In these immersion classes, students will be less exposed to other cul-
tures. 7 9 If the purpose of teaching English is assimilation into the
American culture, separating non-native English speakers from Ameri-
can students hinders that process by failing to provide cultural role mod-
els.180 Likewise, as the world community becomes smaller and the econ-
omy becomes global, Americans need to learn how to conduct business
and interact with persons of other cultures. Integrated classes that do
not subvert foreign cultures would better prepare students for such
dealings. 82
Proposition 227 also could damage dual-language immersion pro-
283grams, despite schools' ability to receive waivers for such programs.
While English-speaking students likely will be able to continue learning
in the highly successful two-way programs under Proposition 227, LEP
students will have to seek waivers annually to remain in the programs.
In addition, educators claim that the mandatory thirty-day, pre-waiver
278. See id.
279. See Marcus, supra note 235, at 492, 503-04. Immersion classes segregate students
by their language background. See id. at 492. By segregating students, interaction is lim-
ited, resulting in less contact between, for example, a Spanish-speaker with a Mexican
background and an English-speaker from the United States. See id. at 503-04.
280. See id. at 503.
281. See id. at 504.
282. See Hyun An, supra note 7, at 155-56 (stating that individuals who speak more
than one language have an advantage in the economic sphere); Marcus, supra note 235, at
504. Agreements such as NAFTA and the GATT will increase the likelihood of conduct-
ing business and economic affairs in countries where English is not the primary language,
or even spoken. See Hyun An, supra note 7, at 155. Therefore, to be successful, individu-
als will need to know more than one language. See id. at 156. The known value of foreign
language classes can be demonstrated through the existence of the traditional school cur-
riculum that offers foreign language instruction. See id. at 156 (calling the policy of en-
couraging native English-speaking American students to learn a second language, but not
encouraging non-English-speaking students to maintain their primary language, "ab-
surd").
283. See Lynn Schnaiberg, Prop. 227 Could Torpedo 'Two Way' Language Programs,
EDUc. WK., May 6, 1998, at 6 (examining Proposition 227's potential impact on dual-
language immersion programs due to its restrictions on the class settings for LEP stu-
dents); Dana Wilkie, 2-Way Language Programs Under Attack: Bilingual Goals Imperiled
Amid Global Marketplace, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Oct. 1, 1998, at A-3 (discussing the
potential for Proposition 227 to disrupt the learning of a second language for English- and
non-English-speaking students).
284. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 310-11 (West Supp. 1999) (waiver provisions); see also
Schnaiberg, Prop. 227 Could Torpedo 'Two Way' Language Programs, supra note 283, at
6; Wilkie, supra note 283, at A-3 (stating that under Proposition 227, annual waivers are
required and that at least one month of each year must be taught entirely in English); su-
pra notes 174-85 and accompanying text (discussing the waiver provisions).
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English-only provision will hinder students that do receive waivers into
the dual-language immersion by reducing the amount of time available to
learn the second language.2 8 ' This loss will affect both native and non-
native English-speaking students because, by losing a month of instruc-
tion, the students may lose some of the language basics and may need to
reacquire those basics.286
V. CONCLUSION
Current studies reveal that bilingual education programs are not
working as effectively as they should. Most experts, however, agree that
this fact is not due to an inherent flaw in the teaching methodology, but
to a lack of funds and qualified teachers. Proposition 227, however, vir-
tually eliminates all bilingual education from the California school sys-
tem and replaces it with a one-year immersion program. Rather than
correcting the problem of limited ability English-speakers, Proposition
227 exacerbates it by providing only limited English instruction before
mainstreaming LEP students and by reducing the amount of cultural in-
teraction that can lead to better understanding and learning. The result
of California's action could be the introduction of similar measures
across the country. If Valeria G. is any indication, courts will be unwill-
ing, or unable due to the vagaries of the language, to strike down such
measures until an injury can be shown. Until that injury exists, school
systems are likely to face confusion and lawsuits due to the interpreta-
tional differences of the ambiguous language. Many states thus may find
themselves needing relief from California's so-called "fix."
285. See Wilkie, supra note 283, at A-3 (quoting an official in charge of dual-language
immersion in Valley Center Union School District in San Diego County).
286. See id.
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